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Article 4

NOTES
Spendthrift Trusts
ATTACHABILITY OF A BENEFICIARY'S INTEREST IN SATISFACTION
OF A TORT CLAIM

Wealthy persons are often the parents of extravagant children. While
the parents live they can maintain control over their children and keep
them from actual want. But after they have passed away they will no
longer be able to personally protect or restrain their offspring against
their own improvidence. The solution for such people is the spendthrift
trust.' A spendthrift trust is one in which the beneficiary is entitled to
the income from the trust property for life, or for a term of years, and
which provides that his interest shall not be transferable by him, and
shall not be subject to the claims of his creditors - a trust in which
there is a valid restraint on2 the voluntary and involuntary transfer of the
interest of the beneficiary.
A distinction should be made between the "spendthrift trust," the
"trust for support" and the "discretionary trust." In all three instances
the interest of the beneficiary is immune to the claims of the creditors,
but for different reasons. In the case of the spendthrift trust, immunity
is the result of an express provision in the instrument which prevents
alienation; the beneficiary's interest in a trust for support is, by its
nature, incapable of being subjected to creditors' claims; while under the
discretionary trust the creditor cannot compel the trustees to pay anything to him because the beneficiary could not compel payment to himself. 3
Even though the terms of the trust or a statute provide that creditors
of a beneficiary shall not be allowed to attach the beneficiary's interest
in the trust, certain classes of creditors have been permitted to reach
his interest.4 The problem with which we are here concerned is whether
or not a tort claimant falls within such a class of creditors. Where the
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust commits a tort against a third person,
can such third person satisfy his claim out of the beneficiary's interest
in the spendthrift trust?
1 In states in which restraints on the alienation of the interest of a beneficiary
are upheld, it is immaterial that the beneficiary is in fact a fully competent person.
See Wagner v. Wagner, 244 Ill. 101, 91 N.E. 66 (1910).
2 See R STATEmENT, TRUSTS § 152 (1935).
3 For a detailed discussion of these distinctions see RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §§
152, 154, 155 (1935).
4 1 ScoTT, TRTUSTS §§ 157- 157.5 (1939); 1A BoGERT, TRuSTS & TRUSTEES §
223 (1951).
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Case authority on the point is practically negligible. An early Pennsylvania case 5 contained dictum to the effect that no distinction should
be drawn between a tort creditor and any other creditor. The court said,
"Whether the judgment be for a breach of contract or for a tort, matters
not."

6

In a later decision 7 in one of the lower Pennsylvania courts it was
held that a beneficiary's interest in a spendthrift trust was not subject
to attachment for an unsatisfied judgment rendered in the court of a
sister state for damages for tort. In this case the spendthrift trust expressly provided that the income of the trust was to be paid as it accrued
and was not to be paid by way of anticipation and that the beneficiary's
interest was not to be subject to his "debts, contracts, or engagements."
The plaintiff argued that the word "debts," used by the settlor should
have been interpreted in a strict technical sense and with a limited meaning so as to exclude all liabilities originating in tort. The court refused to
follow the plaintiff's argument. It stated that the general policy of the
Pennsylvania courts was to uphold spendthrift trusts, not out of any
regard for the beneficiary, or desire to aid him in escaping payment of
his just obligations, but solely to protect the donor's right of property.
The court conceded that an unliquidated liability for tort was not technically a debt but stated that a debt arose when the liability became
liquidated and was reduced to judgment. The court said that upon reduction to judgment, it became a "debt of record" which was a contract
of the highest nature.
The Pennsylvania court in the above case held, in effect, that the tort
claimant, by reducing his claim to judgment, became an ordinary creditor. Even though it is usually held that a tort claim merges with the
judgment, this would seem to be giving undue weight to form.
The above view would probably be disapproved in view of recent
Pennsylvania cases. In one case 8 the court stated that spendthrift trusts
were against public policy in Pennsylvania in so far as they might defeat
the claims of a wife for support and maintenance. Wives are entitled to
recover against the beneficial interest of their husbands as though no
spendthrift clause was contained in the will or deed creating the trust.
The court held that a wife suing on a judgement for support rendered by
a Florida court would be allowed to recover. The court said that she did
not lose her claim against the trust simply because she had obtained a
judgment.
5 Thackara v. Mintzer, 100 Pa. 151 (1882).
Id. at 154-155.
7 Davies v. Harrison, Jr., 3 Pa. D. & C. 481 (C.P. 1923). See also Blakemore v.
Jones, 303 Mass. 557, 22 N.E.(2d) 112 (1939) in which a trustee-beneficiary of a
6

spendthrift trust committed a breach of trust. Held, that his interest as beneficiary
could not be reached to satisfy the damage claim.
8 Ix re Stewart's Estate, 334 Pa. 365, 5 A.(2d) 910 (1939). Also see Lippincott
v. Lippincott, 28 Pa. D. & C. 28 (C.P. 1936).

NOTES
Before proceeding further in the discussion of whether or not a tort
claimant may satisfy his claim out of the interest of a beneficiary in a
spendthrift trust, it woud probably be wise to discuss the status of
spendthrift trusts in the United States generally.
In the majority of states today spendthrift trusts are recognized as
being valid.9 They are allowed either without qualification, or subject
to statutory restrictions. Jurisdictions holding spendthrift trusts valid
may be divided into the following classes: 10 (a) those jurisdictions
which have upheld the spendthrift trust without any limitation as to the
size of the income or the needs of the beneficiary; (b) those states having statutes similar to New York statutes which allow spendthrift trusts
to an extent necessary to support and educate the cestui in the manner
of life to which he has been accustomed; "- and (c) those states in which
the spendthrift
trust is limited as to size of corpus or purpose of the
2
trust.1
There is a small group of states which follows the English view that
spendthrift trusts are invalid in so far as they restrain the voluntary and
involuntary transfer of the interest of the beneficiary.' 3 In these states
the beneficiary's interest is freely alienable by himself and attachable
by his creditors.
In the leading case of Broadway National Bank v. Adams,14 the court
admitted that a provision made by the donor of a legal interest that it
should not be alienated was invalid, but held that this was not so in
regard to the equitable interest created under a trust.15 The court
stated that the creator of the trust was the absolute owner of the
property and that his directions should be followed unless they were
contrary to public policy. The court thought that there was nothing
against public policy in giving the beneficiary such a qualified interest
9 For a collection of cases see Note, 119 A.L.R. 19 (1939)
A.L.R. 1319 (1942).
10 1A BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 222 (1951).

supplemented in 138

11 CAr. CiV. CODE § 859 (1949) ; MIc.
§ 501:14 (1949); MONT. Rzv. CODES ANN.

STAT. AmN. § 26:63 (1937) ; MuN. STAT.
§ 86:106 (1947); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§98; N.D. REv. CODE § 59:0310 (1943); OrA. STAT. tit.
60, § 140 (1951); SM.
CODE § 59:0306 (1939) ; Wis. STAT. § 231:13 (1951).
12 ALA. CODE tit. 58, § 1 (1940) ; ARz. CODE ANN. § 41:112 (1939) ; CONN. GEN.

STAr. § 8034 (1949); LA. Rzv. STAT. AwN. § 9:1923 (1950); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41:9
(1950) ; OmLA. STAT. tit.
60, § 175:25 (1951) ; VA. CODE § 55:19 (1950).
13 Cecil's Trustee v. Robertson & Bro., 32 Ky. L. R. 357, 105 S.W. 926 (1907);
Brahmey v. Rollins, 87 N.H. 290, 179 AUt. 186 (1935); Tillinghast v. Bradford,
5 R.I. 205 (1858).
14 133 Mass. 170,173,43 Am. Rep. 504 (1882).
15 In Brahmey v. Rollins, 87 N.H. 290, 179 At. 186 (1935) it was argued that
the common law rule of property invalidating direct restraints upon alienation
applies with equal force to equitable interests, but in Broadway National Bank v.
Adams, supra, it was held that the beneficiary's interest is a creature of equity,
existing in spite of the rules of property and that equity can determine its nature.
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in the income, unless the effect was to defraud creditors. The court
pointed out that the creditors were not defrauded since they could have
learned of the restriction if they were diligent. In substance the argument of the court was that the owner of property should be able to
dispose of it in any way he chooses so long as no third person is injured
thereby. The restraint on alienation imposed on the beneficiary is no
injury to his creditors, since, if it were not for the disposition, they could
not have reached the property anyway, and if they were deceived into
extending credit in reliance upon the beneficiary's interest in the trust,
they had only themselves to blame, for6 they would not have been deceived if they had examined the record.1
A Pennsylvania court stated its argument in upholding a spendthrift
trust as follows: '7
The law rests its protection of what is known as a spendthrift trust
18
fundamentally on the principle of cujus est dare, cujus est desponere.E It
allows the donor to condition his bounty as suits himself so long as he
violates no law in so doing. When a trust of this kind has been created, the
law holds that the donor has an individual right of property in the
execution of the trust; and to deprive him of it would be a fraud on his
generosity. For the law to appropriate a gift to a person not intended
It is always
would be an invasion of the donor's private dominion ....
to be remembered that consideration for the beneficiary does not even in
the remotest way enter into the policy of the law. It has regard solely to
the rights of the donor. Spendthrift trusts can have no other justification
than is to be found in consideration affecting the donor alone. They allow
the donor to so control his bounty, through the creation of the trust, . . .
not because the law is concerned to keep the donee from wasting it, but
because it is concerned to protect the donor's right of property.

Where the settlor provides that the interest of a beneficiary shall not
be alienable by him or attachable by his creditors, the only substantial
question in regard to the validity of the provision, according to Professor
Scott, is whether it is against public policy to give effect to it. 19
Law, it would seem, is simply the crystallization of public policies
which attempt to promote the orderly conduct of society. Often, these
policies are in direct conflict. Thus, to uphold the spendthrift provisions
in a trust gives support to the basic policy that a donor has a right to
16 In Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 23 L. Ed. 254, 257 (1875) it was stated;
"Why a parent or one who loves another, and wishes to use his own property in
securing the object of his affection, as far as property can do it, from the ills of
life, the vicissitudes of fortune and even his own improvidence or incapacity for selfprotection, should not be permitted to do so, is not readily perceived." (Dictum).
Similar statements appear in Canfield v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 13 Cal.(2d) 1,
87 P.(2d) 830, 835 (1939) ; Frensley v. Frensley, 177 Okla. 221, 58 P.(2d) 307, 315
(1936) ; Adams v. Williams, 112 Tex. 469, 248 S.W. 673 (1923) ; Huestis v. Manley,
110 Vt. 413, 8 A.(2d) 644 (1939).
17 In re Morgan's Estate, 223 Pa. 228, 72 Atl. 498, 499 (1909).
18 "Whose it is to give, his it is to dispose," or "The bestower of a gift has a
right to regulate its disposal."
19 1 ScoTT, TRusTs § 152 (1939).

NOTES
dispose of his property as he so desires. However, upholding spendthrift
trusts runs against the general policy of the law that a creditor has a
right to secure satisfaction from his debtor's property. The majority of
courts have given spendthrift trusts their blessing, leaving the policy
protecting creditors a poor runner-up.
Even though a spendthrift trust will be upheld in most jurisdictions it
would seem to be well within the power of the court of equity to give
relief to certain creditors with peculiarly powerful claims on the
sympathy of the court. Ordinarily, contract creditors cannot reach the
beneficiary's interest because, as stated above, they have only themselves
to blame if they extend credit to him without first ascertaining the
amount of his resources which are available for the discharge of his
debts. It does not appear unfair to place upon such a creditor the
burden of checking the credit risk, and placing the risk of loss upon him
for his failure to do so. But this line of reasoning is not applicable to
certain classes of creditors who did not voluntarily extend credit to the
beneficiary. To leave involuntary creditors who had no opportunity to
check resources, or who were forced into this relationship with the
spendthrift, in the same position is more suggestive of injustice or unfairness.
A number of courts have realized that certain claimants are on a
different footing from normal creditors and have allowed the claimants
to reach the interest of the beneficiary.2 0 The interest of the beneficiary
has been reached (a) by the wife or child of the beneficiary for support,
or by the wife for alimony, and (b) by the United States or a state or
subdivision thereof to satisfy a claim against the beneficiary. Also creditors who have rendered necessary services or furnished necessary supplies
to the beneficiary have been placed in a different position from ordinary
contract creditors and have been allowed to recover.
There is a conflict of authority on the question of the right of dependents of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust to reach his interest.
There have been cases which have allowed the wife or child to recover
on the ground that the settlor intended that they should be supported
by the husband and father out of the funds paid to him.2 Other
decisions have been based on the ground that it is against public policy
to permit the beneficiary to have the enjoyment of the income from the
trust while he refused to provide for dependents whom he had a duty
to support.22 A Pennsylvania court in holding that the public policy of
20 See RESTATEMENT, TRusTs § 157 (1935) for a list of particular classes of
claimants which are allowed to reach a spendthrift's interest.
21 England v. England, 223 Ill. App. 549 (1922); Marsh v. Scott, 2 N.J. Super.
240, 63 A.(2d) 275 (1949); Obendorf v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 208 N.Y. 367,
102 N.E. 534 (1913); In re Morehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 Atl. 802 (1927);
Thomas v. Thomas, 112 Pa. Super. 578, 172 Atl. 36 (1934).
22 Safe Deposit &Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Robertson, 19 Md. 653, 65 A.(2d)
292 (1949) ; Lippincott v. Lippincott, 349 Pa. 501, 37 A.(2d) 741 (1944). Contra:
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requiring support for wives and children was stronger than the policy
behind spendthrift trusts said: 23
The Commonwealth has a vital interest in the maintenance of marriage,
because it is the foundation of society .... "the Commonwealth is vitally
interested not only in the moral and social factors involved but also in
preventing deserted wives from becoming public charges."

The public policy of permitting dependents of the beneficiary of a
spendthrift trust to reach his interest has been codified in some states.
There are now statutes to this effect in Louisiana, 24 Missouri, 25 Okla27

homa, 26 and Pennsylvania.

Statutes enabling creditors of any class to reach the surplus income
not needed for the care and education of the beneficiary furnish a means
in some states for at least a limited satisfaction of the claims of a wife
28
or children to support or alimony.
It has been held that government claims against the beneficiary of a
spendthrift trust for unpaid taxes can be satisfied out of the beneficiary's
interest. It makes no difference whether the claim is related to income
received under the trust, or whether it is a claim for a tax due from the
beneficiary with respect to other property owned by him. 29 In In re
Rosenberg's Will,30 the court stated that no policy of the state protecting
spendthrift trusts from creditors could interfere with the power of
Congress to levy and collect taxes on income, and that Section 98 of the
Schwager v. Schwager, 109 F.(2d) 754 (7th Cir. 1940) ; In re Bucklin's Estate, 51
N.W.(2d) 412 (Iowa 1952); Erickson v. Erickson, 197 Minn. 71, 266 N.W. 161
(1936). In 266 N.W. at 164, the court stated: "If alimony or support money is to be
an exception to the protection offered by spendthrift provisions it must be by some
justifiable interpretation of the donor's language by which such implied exception
may be fairly construed into the instrument of trust. It cannot logically arise out
of the character of the obligation (though some cases so hold)."
23 Lippincott v. Lippincott, 349 Pa. 501, 37 A.(2d) 741, 743 (1944).
24

LA.REV. STAT. § 9:1923 (1950).

25 Mo.REV. STAT. § 456:080 (1949). "All restraints upon the right of the cestui
que trust to alienate or anticipate the income of any trust estate in the form of a
spendthrift trust, or otherwise, and all attempts to withdraw said income of any
trust estate from the claims of creditors of the cestui que trust, whether said restraints be by will or by deed, now existing or in force, or, which may be hereafter
executed in this state, be and the same are hereby declared null and void and of no
effect, as against the claims of any wife, child or children, or said cestui que trust
for support and maintenance, or, as against the claim of any said wife for alimony."
26
Oxu.A. STAT. ANN. tit.
60, § 175:25 (1951).
27 PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 20, § 301:12 provides that, "Income of a trust subject to
spendthrift or similar provisions shall nevertheless be liable for the support of anyone whom the income beneficiary shall be under a legal duty to support." See also
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4733 (1945) ; PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 48, § 136 (1930).
28 Fink v. Fink, 139 Misc. 630, 248 N.Y.Supp. 129 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Wetmore v.
Wetmore, 149 N.Y. 520,44 N.E. 169 (1896).
29 United States v. Mercantile Trust Co. of Baltimore, 62 F. Supp. 837 (D. Md.
1945); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hofferbert, 58 F. Supp. 701 (D. Md. 1944).
30 269 N.Y.247, 199 N.E. 206 (1935).
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Civil Practice Act of New York restricting creditors to ten percent of the
income did not apply to the federal government.
It has been held in a number of cases that a person who furnishes
necessaries to the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust can reach his interest
in such trust.31 A physician or a hospital which has rendered necessary
32
medical services has been allowed to recover out ofa spendthrift trust.

Where, however, the necessaries were furnished without the knowledge
of the trustee, who was not neglecting to support the beneficiary, a
33
recovery has been denied.
The apparently total lack of case authority in point on whether a tort
claimant may recover damages out of a spendthrift's trust interest
renders a positive statement on the question impossible at this time.
However, there seems to be no sound reason for placing the tort claimant
in the same class with ordinary contract creditors. As regards opportunity to investigate assets, which appears to be the main consideration in
denying contract creditors recovery, there is no similarity. As has been
stated by Professor Scott: 34
A man who is about to be knocked down by an automobile has no
opportunity to investigate the credit of the driver of the automobile, and
has no opportunity to avoid being injured no matter what the resources
of the driver may be.

A sense of justice suggests that the tort claimant belongs more properly
in the class of other special claimants just mentioned who have been
permitted to recover their debts out of his interest in the trust.
The view that the primary concern of the courts in the field of spendthrift trusts is not to protect the spendthrift beneficiary but rather to
uphold the settlor's right to dispose of property as he sees fit has been
seriously discredited. In addition to numerous statutes and decisions
which have detracted considerably from the idea of absolute immunity,
the view has also been sharply attacked by legal scholars. 35
The argument that the victim of a tort is actually in no worse position
than if the tort feasor were penniless may be true in certain instances;
nevertheless it is obviously unjust to allow the beneficiary to continue
enjoying his property while the injured tort claimant remains unrecompensed.
31 Cooper v. Carter, 145 Mo. App. 387, 1.29 S.W. 224 (1910); In re Mayer's
Will, 59 N.Y.S.(2d) 561 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
32 Sherman v. Skuse, 166 N.Y. 345, 59 N.E. 990 (1901); In re Berrien's Estate,
147 Misc. 788, 264 N.Y. Supp. 593 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
33 Charles, Inc. v. Mellor, 20 Pa. D. & C. 464 (C. P. 1934).
34 1 ScoTT, TRusTs § 157.5 (1939).
35

Griswold, Reaching the Interest of the Beneficiary of A Spendthrift Trust,

43 HtAv. L. Rv. 63 (1929) ; Costigan, Those Protective Trusts Which are Miscalled
"Spendthrift Trusts" Reexamined, 22 CAr. L. REv. 471, 483 et seq (1934).
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In a number of states there are statutes like Section 98 of New York
Real Property Law, which provides that creditors may reach the surplus
income accruing to the beneficiary of a trust, "beyond the sum necessary
for the education and support of the beneficiary." Such provisions are
in effect in California, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Dakota and Wisconsin. 6
In New York the statute does not specify what sum shall be regarded
as necessary for the education and support of the beneficiary. The courts
of New York have decided this question by applying what is known as
the "station in life" rule. Thus, the amount necessary for a beneficiary's
education and support varies with his "station in life." The rule has been
severely criticized for its undue regard to the lavish propensities of a
spendthrift who has accustomed himself to a life which leaves little or no
surplus for his creditors.
Section 684 of New York Civil Practice Act provides that any interest
in a spendthrift trust which pays the beneficiary thirty dollars or more
per week, in a city with a population of over two hundred and fifty
thousand - twenty-five dollars per week in all other areas - shall be
subject to the attachment of judgment creditors in an amount not to
exceed ten percent of the value of such interest during any one period.
The statute also provides that the levy shall be a continuing levy until
the judgment creditor's execution is satisfied, and where several executions are issued against the same debtor they are to be satisfied in the
this section does not aid the creditor until
order of priority.37 However,
38
he has obtained judgment.

It has been held that where a creditor has obtained an order garnishing ten percent of the beneficiary's income under Section 684 of New
York Civil Practice Act, he can also, under Section 98 of New York Real
Property Law, reach the surplus income not necessary for the beneficiary's support and education, since these statutory remedies are cumulative.39 These statutes attempt to give some relief to all types of
creditors.
There are statutes in Oklahoma 4" and Louisiana, 41 patterned upon 42a
model statute suggested by Dean Griswold of the Harvard Law School
See note 11 supra.
An almost identical statute was enacted in Indiana, IND. STAT. ANN. § 2:4501
(Burns 1933), but was held unconstitutional as violating the Due Process Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Amend. XIV, and the
Indiana Constitution Art. I, § 23 guaranteeing equal privileges and immunities.
Galesburg Coulter Disc Co. v. Hunter, 208 Ind. 330, 196 N.E. 94 (1935).
36
3T

Judis v. Martin, 218 App. Div. 402, 218 N.Y.Supp. 423 (1st. Dep't 1926).
In re Brown's Estate, 35 N.Y.S.(2d) 646 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd. mem., 264
App. Div. 824,35 N.Y.S.(2d) 738 (4th Dep't 1942).
40
OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175:25 (1951).
41 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:1923 (1950).
38

39

42

GRiswoLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS 477 (1st. ed. 1936).

NOTES
which provide that all income in excess of five thousand dollars per
annum accruing from a spendthrift trust shall be subject to attachment
by creditors of the beneficiary. The Louisiana statute provides, in addition, for garnishment of ten percent of all income from spendthrift
trusts in excess of twelve dollars per week. Both statutes contain express
provisions empowering the courts of the state to order the payment of
any or all of the income accruing to the beneficiary in satisfaction of
claims for (a) support of a husband, wife, or child of the beneficiary,
(b) necessary services rendered or necessary supplies furnished to the
beneficiary, or (c) a judgment based on any such claim under (a) or
(b). The Louisiana statute, in addition, provides that the beneficiary's
interest shall be fully subject to claims arising out of a tort or a judgment based thereon. 43 These special-claimants provisions
are in addition
44
to the other remedies provided under the statute.
Conclusion
Both judicial decisions and legislative enactments of the past twentyfive years have evidenced a steady trend toward limiting the inaccessibiliity of spendthrift trusts where special classes of claimants are concerned.
The spirit of nineteenth century individualism which originally validated
these trusts has been gradually replaced by a growing sense of social
justice which, while it recognizes and approves the desirable elements
inherent in spendthrift provisions, has increasingly attempted to qualify
their application according to principles of fairness and justice.
Although it is not unreasonable for the settlor, in creating a trust, to
protect the beneficiary against his own improvidence by provisions
against alienation, there seems to be little justice in extending such a
provision to the claims of involuntary creditors. Few, if any of the
arguments supporting the spendthrift trust as against a voluntary creditor have any application to a man injured through a tort by the beneficiary. There appears to be no equity whatever, and little if any justice,
in permitting the tort-feasor to enjoy the comparative luxury of his
trust income while the tort claimant receives no recompense for the
injury suffered at his hands.
The solution to the problem would appear to lie in the establishment
or the recognition of a public policy in the states, permitting involuntary
creditors to recover out of the spendthrift's interest. While such recognition might just as easily stem from the courts as from the legislatures,
in the interests of uniformity and certainty, it is the belief of this writer
43 The Louisiana statute expressly provides that the court may make such order
as is just in connection with claims for torts or judgments for torts. The Oklahoma
statute did not include the provision of the model statute as to torts.
44 The other remedies are the $5000.00 per annum provision, and the provision
concerning the garnishing of ten percent of all income over $12.00 per week.
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that the policy should be expressed through positive enactments .by the
legislatures. The adoption of the model statute on spendthrift trusts
advocated by Dean Griswold of the Harvard Law School should go far
toward eliminating most of the evils which accompany such trusts while
still retaining their desirable elements.
William N. Antonis

Taxation
TAX IMPLICATIONS OF A GIFT To A CHILD OF
INCOME PRODUCING PROPERTY

Introduction
Basic to the solution of the problem of successful intra-family wealth
distribution so as to minimize taxes is the gift; and when the gift can
take the form of a gift of income producing property it is potent indeed
to stave off the inroads of the tax collector into the family wealth.
Such a gift has, most obviously, estate tax implications, in that it reduces the donor's estate at death. In addition, and perhaps more important, a gift of income producing property has income tax consequences. Finally, a gift of this character, in view of the fact that minor
children may be involved, has imporant gift tax problems which must be
considered. The aim of this article will be to deal with problems in
making these distributions effective from the point of view of the Federal
Income Tax and the Federal Gift Tax. Specifically involved will be two
problems: (1) Securing attribution of income to property donated; and
(2) Securing, if feasible, the benefit of the annual exclusion under the
gift tax. Estate tax considerations will be treated only incidentally.
Particular attention will be directed to a gift of a partnership interest,
creating a family partnership, the "litigation-breeder" which recently
received what has been characterized as "off-hand" legislative treatment.1
"Estate planning" is a current term for an ancient prudence. It has
never been defined as a mere series of tax reducing formulae. But taxes
are one factor, perhaps an unfortunately large one, influencing the direction of property and the arrangement of affairs. 2
Gifts to children have long played an important role in estate planning.
Tax considerations alone cannot be blamed for this fact. There are
1 Lifton, The Family Partnership:Here We Go Again, 7 TAx L. REv. 461, 480
(1952). Whether or not this phrase properly characterizes the congressional measure,
there is no doubt of one aspect it suggests: there remains more than ample room for
litigation.
2 Twentieth Century Fund, Taxation as an Instrument of Social Control in
FACING THE TAX PROBLE

129 (1937).

NOTES
several other weighty reasons why an individual with a faily large estate
would desire to utilize inter vivos gifts to his children as an important
element in the distfibution of his property:
A gift may have the effect of aiding a dear one at the time he needs it
most, instead of forcing him to anticipate the death of his ancestor.
A gift may enable the donor to achieve the satisfaction of seeing the
objects of his bounty in enjoyment of some of his property prior to his
death.
A gift may test the capacity of a donee to deal with property, and be
a gauge for future testamentary disposition. A gift may condition expectant heirs for what is planned in the future.
Moreover, a gift may establish the independence of donees prior to the
date of the donor's death. If timely made, it may secure the donees
against financial risks to which the affairs of the donor may expose him,
and within certain limitations, remove property from the potential grasp
of creditors.3
Suffice it to say that donative disposition of property will always be
and has always been of considerable utility in estate planning, even
apart from tax considerations. But taxation has had its role in recent
years. Apart from the very disturbed individual who might make a senseless disposition of property in order to reduce government's participation
in his wealth, even the hypothetical man spoken of by the economists
would very likely alter his estate distribution plans when a tax saving
exceeded the marginal measure of desirability of some former disposition.
The by-product of progressive rates in taxation has been the endeavor
to shift wealth to other members of the family. Such shifting, if carefully done, can save large amounts of tax; but few problems have
occasioned more litigation and difficulty in the formation and administration of the tax laws.
The split concept of marital property, embodied in the Revenue Act
of 1948 4 which cuts across the lines of estate and gift as well as income
taxation, whether in the interest of a more just tax incidence or not, has
mitigated the problem in the area of husband and wife transactions.
The problem with respect'to the remainder of the family circle looms
larger. Highlighted in this area is the problem of the tax-inspired transaction with one's child. And the partnership provisions in the Revenue
Act of 19515 have increased the expectancies of the taxpayer as to what
he can do along these lines. 6
3 See e.g., UNuonm FRAoULEN-T CONvEYA cE AcT §§ 5, 6, 9A U-iroRM LAWS
AN. 90-92 (1951).
4 INT. REV. CODE § 12(d). See Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family - The
Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1103 et seq. (1948).
5

INT. REV. CODE § 191.

6 For an illustration of surtax savings available through this device, see Packel,
The Next Inning of Family Partnerships,100 U. or PA. L. Rav. 153 (1951).
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The problems involved in these transactions, such as retained control,
completeness of disposition, simultaneous enjoyment, substance versus
form, and other tests used to overturn tax avoiding schemes are sufficiently complicated when individuals sui juris are involved. Minority
itself, with its consequent natural and legal disability adds to these
difficulties. 7 And many of the most desirable tax transactions, particularly at the present, involve youngsters.
There is, and has been, a persistent social force impelling the increased
recognition of the individuality under the law of the constituent members of the family unit, wives and children alike. 8 The fact remains,
nevertheless, that within a closely knit family organization there is a
considerable degree of mutual and simultaneous enjoyment of wealth.
Even under the present arrangement, the tax law must in many instances
ignore state laws regarding the rights of parents to their children's
income when it taxes that income to the child himself. But even with the
child as a separate taxpayer, the courts and legal writers refuse, in the
interests of fairly distributing the national burden, to completely ignore
what are often fused economic interests.9
Attribution
Economists ascribe income to labor, capital and profit, the economist's
profit, or pure profit, being that remaining after a reasonable allocation
has been made to the other two income producing factors. 10 It makes no
difference to the economist that these salaries, including salaries for
proprietary services, and the interest on capital, including invested capital, has not actually been paid or incurred." Traditionally the accountant, however, has declined to recognize any reduction of profits by costs
not actually incurred; proprietary salaries or an allowance for interest
and would be regarded as a
on invested capital would be unacceptable,
2
hypothetical cost in the accounts.'
Discussion of the difficulties which minority adds to an already difficult tax
7
area can be found in Fleming, Gifts for the Benefit of Minors, 49 MIcH. L. REv. 529
(1951); Rogers, Some Practical Considerationsin Gifts to Minors, 20 FoPo. L. REV.
233 (1951); Shattuck, A Practical Consideration of Some of the Legal and Tax
Problems Inherent in Gifts to Minors, 31 B. U. L. REv. 451 (1951). Many of these
difficulties will be discussed in the course of this paper.
8 The policy finds its most obvious expression in the Married Woman's Property
Acts, and other legislation increasing the social, economic and political status of
women. Further recognition of it is to be found in the assault being made on the
common law rule precluding tort actions by a child against his parent. Details concerning this policy are beyond the scope of this paper.
9 For a suggestion that the family be taxed as a unit, see Bruton, The Taxation
of Family Income, 41 YALE L.J. 1172, 1191 (1932). For a critique of family taxation, see Ryan, Federal Tax Treatment of the Family, 32 IARQ. L. REv. 244 (1949);
Surrey, supra note 4.
10 12 ENCYC. Soc. Scr., Profit 481 (1933).
11 Id.at 482.
12 1 ENCYC. Soc. Scr., Accounting 412 (1933).

NOTES
So too, the tax structure, in the matter of income determination, has
declined to accept the economists' definition of profit. Deductions are
13
allowed solely on the basis of incurred rather than hypothetical costs,'
and income has not been treated any differently because economically
it may be ascribed to one factor rather than another.
In the area of income attribution, however, where the problem is not
the determination of the amount of income but the determination of who
should be taxed on it, the courts have been forced to these considerations. 14 To employ Justice Holmes' oft quoted metaphor, the courts
seek to ascribe the fruit to the tree that bore it.15
Two basic precepts have developed: Income from labor is to be
ascribed to the one whose services produced it; income from capital
should be taxed to the owner of the capital. 16 The economists' pure
profit, presumably, goes to capital.
Unfortunately for theory at least, these standards are not inexorable,
even apart from any practical difficulties they may present in actual'
application. They do present, however, the working premises for the
solution of any assignment of income problem. There is no explicit statement of them in the Internal Revenue Code; they have been recognized
indirectly in the partnership provisions above referred8 to n7 and have
been read into Section 22 (a) of the Code by the courts.'

Lucas v. Earl' 9 involved an assignment of future income by an
attorney-husband through a contract with his wife providing that she
should be entitled to one-half of all he should acquire. Being thus
13 A controversial exception exists in the case of percentage depletion allowed
on certain mineral property. INT. REv. CODE § 114(b) (3-4).
14 E.g., Justice Frankfurter concurring in Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S.
733 (1949): "The word 'income' has none but an economic significance, and so the
application of § 22(a) is properly a matter of economic analysis."
15 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930). This analogy, the famed "horticultural allusion," has been very frequently used in this area. But consider the following from Doyle v. Commissioner, 147 F.(2d) 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1945): "But, in
the instant case, we do not find that the tree-and-fruit metaphor, despite its figurative charm, is of great assistance in solving our problem.... Yet, here, as we view
the situation with all the dispassionate calm at our command, the tree appears, by
some subtle economic alchemy, to have been virtually transmuted into the fruit."
See also, Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration, 58 HAv.
L. REv. 477, 494 (1945): "But it is not always a simple matter to distinguish the
'tree' from 'the fruits' and the metaphor may easily be expanded to include such
additional refinements as 'the seed' and 'the branch."' Soil, Intra-Family Assignments: Attribution and Realization of Income, 6 TAx L. Rxv. 435, 443-44 (1951).
16 INcomE TAx STATUTE A. L. I. 8 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1949).
17 See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
18
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), is dearly at the foundation of this attribution. Most of the other important limitations on the ability to secure reallocation of income have also been engrafted on Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code.

19

281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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entitled to half (under a contract apparently untouched by any tax
motives when made) the taxpayer argued that his wife should be taxed
on that half and the earner taxed only on his half. But all was taxed to
the assignor. The court said: 20
There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned
them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory
arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the
salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned
it. That seems to us the import of the statute before us and we think that
no distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on
which they grew.

Motive in this connection thus became completely immaterial. Control
by the husband over the income thus assigned was considered by some,
21
however, to be at the basis of the decision. It was believed that the
the husband earned the
fact
that
the
as
much
not
was
factor
material
income as that he controlled it, if only in the negative way that he could
22
discontinue his services and thus cut off the flow of income. Thus it
was believed that where the income antedated the assignment, the income
shifting would stand.
Helvering v. Eubank,23 in 1940, settled this matter. There an insurance agent attempted to assign his renewal commissions on insurance
business previously obtained. No future services were necessary to perfect the right to receive the income; it was contingent merely upon the
renewal by policy holders of their policies. No vestige of control could
be found. But the choice of the taxable person in this area was not made
to rest upon control, but on the simple fact that the assignor earned the
income.
The principle that income from services should be taxable to the
earner without regard to the question of control is further borne out by
the taxation of income to the earner despite the fact that he assigns it
24
to a charity over which he has no control, or where he simply refuses
25
it goes directly to a trustee in bankruptcy for the
to accept it, or where
26
benefit of creditors.
Id. at 114-15.
See Soll, supra note 15, at 438 citing Magill, Taxable Income 257 (1936) and
others. See also Commissioner v. Bateman, 127 F.(2d) 266, 272-73 (1st Cir. 1942);
Matchette v. Helvering, 81 F.(2d) 73, 74-5 (2d Cir. 1936).
22 Matchette v. Helvering, 81 F.(2d) 73, 74-5 (2d Cir. 1936).
20

21

23

311 U.S. 122 (1940).

24

U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-2(b)

(1943).

Contra: Commissioner v.

Giannini, 129 F.(2d) 628 (9th Cir. 1942); Commissioner v. Bateman, 127 F.(2d)
266 (1st Cir. 1942).

25

Hedrick v. Commissioner, 154 F.(2d) 90 (2d Cir. 1946).

26

Parkford v. Commissioner, 133 F.(2d) 249, 251 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 319

U.S. 741 (1943).

NOTES
A close question may arise, however, as to whether income is truly
the result of mere services or of capital. 27 Where the former predominates, taxation of the donor inay be expected.2 8 Thus, in Hogle v. Commissioner,29 a father, whose business was that of broker, created a trust
for his children consisting of a trading account, which the father operated in connection with his other operations. The funds remained in the
father's possession. When profits resulted from trading, the income was
taxed to the father rather than to the trust, the court stating that: "In
substance, he [Hoglel gave to the trust in each of those years the profits
derived from a designated portion of his individual efforts." 30 With
respect to non-trading gains, however, the trust was taxable, these being
attributed to the property rather than to the services.
Several recent cases dealing with income resulting from farm stock
suggest a different conclusion in the case of an activity of that character,31 but it is submitted that those cases do not cut the rationale of the
Hogle case, and may be of doubtful value.
Further discussion of the attributability of income as to either services
or capital, and the problem of apportionment as between them is reserved until later as is a discussion of both the attribution and the
realization problem suggested by the farm cases.
While the principle that income from services will be ascribed to the
person who performs the services, irrespective of control or other extraneous factors, needs little qualification; the principle that income from
capital will be ascribed to the owner of the capital does not weather the
test of the decisions so well.
At the outset, it might be well to consider whether it should. Assume
family A has an income of fifty thousand dollars derived entirely from
the father's personal services. Compare it with family B which has an
income of the same amount derived entirely from the father's investments. It appears that in no instance could family A reallocate its income
so as to minimize surtaxes. But since ownership of property is readily
transferable, family B has definite possibilities of such reallocation.
Nor will the principle that income from capital is to be ascribed to the
owner of the capital stand too invulnerably if we qualify it by saying
that "legal" ownership does not necessarily mean the same thing as "tax"
27 This question is dealt with in connection with earnings from a partnership,
infra.
28 Thus, there can be no assignment of income from a business or profession,
the income of which is derived from fees, commissions, or other payments or gains
from services.
29 132 F.(2d) 66 (10th Cir. 1942).
30 Id. at 71.

31 Visintainer v. Commissioner, 187 F.(2d) 519 (10th Cir. 1951) (where a
rancher branded cattle for his children and raised them with the rest of his stock);
Alexander v. Commissioner, 194 F.(2d) 921 (5th Cir. 1952) (same).
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ownership. But it helps. A strange tax concept of what is property for
these purposes enters the picture as well; retained control, and a retained
reversionary interest after a relatively short grant also take on a significance which a bland recitation of the principle will hardly accord them.
First as to the problem of ownership. It is clear that in order to escape
taxation on the income from capital one must part with ownership of it.
Bare legal title, however, lost its magic at a very early date as tax dates
go, and we find the constantly recurring theme in the income attribution
cases that taxes are not concerned with the refinements of legal title. 32
Ownership involves the possession of various rights in respect of
property, most important of which are a jus disponendi, control, and
rights to present enjoyment and possession of property.33 Any retention
of control militates against a contention that the ownership of property
has in substance been transferred, and the issue of ownership and the
issue of retained control in the tax cases are closely related. But the
rights in respect of property can'be split and dealt with in a multitude
of patterns, particularly in the trust arrangement. Moreover, control can
be achieved indirectly by strong moral influence where no legal right may
exist. A strong-willed father can perhaps control property of the son to
some extent even where the property was acquired by the son's own
efforts; how much more can he do so when he has previously given the
property to his son!
What has been termed the "ownership test" has, accordingly been
the primary tool for judicial attack upon the intra-family assignment of
property. 34 And when, as in the typical family circle, retention of a
measure of control is coupled with a pre-existent degree of mutual enjoyment of property, the situation is frequently said to invite careful
scrutiny.35
Here, therefore, is an area which is characterized by cautious planning, careful drafting, and carefully observing rituals and rights bestowed
36
on a donee, for which the donee himself may care little at times.
When a family transfer purports to be outright, a typical nontrust
3
transfer, the ownership and control issues are chiefly issues of fact,' '
and the courts will try to find underlying realities which belie appearances. A wide variety of circumstances has been looked into in this
regard.38
32

33
34
35

Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930).
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 10, comment b (1936).

Soil, supra note 15, at 440.
See, e.g. H.R.REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1951); Helvering v.

Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940).

36 For cautions in this area, particularly in connection with trusts, see Lourie,
Marital Settlements and Family Gifts, 30 TAXEs 522, 523-26 (1952).
37 See Paul, Restatement of the Law of Tax Avoidance in STUDIES 3N FEDERAL
TAXATION 150-1 (1937).

NOTES
With respect to transfers in trust the issue will often be the extent of
retained control, to be determined by a reading of the trust instrument,
giving the broadest possible interpretation to any powers which the
grantor has retained. 30 This rule of law, besides being well defined
40
judicially, has received legislative sanction.
Blair v. Commissioner4 ' involved a life beneficiary of the income of a
trust who assigned this income to his children for the duration of his
life. Previously, the Illinois Appellate Court had held that the trust of
which Blair was beneficiary was not a spendthrift trust and that his
assignment of his beneficial interest therein was valid. The Supreme
Court held that the assignment was valid for income tax purposes as
well, and that the income was taxable to the assignees. The Court pointed out that the interest under the trust which Blair possessed made him
equitable owner of property which he coild transfer in whole or in part,
and added:

42

The assignment of the beneficial interest is not the assignment of a chose
in action but of the "right, title, and estate in and to property." ...
We conclude that the assignments were valid, that the assignees thereby
became the owners of the specified beneficial interests in the income, and
that as to these interests they and not the petitioner were taxable ....

Accepting the doctrine at the base of this decision -

that a benefi-

ciary's interest in a trust is in equity an ownership of the trust res - the
Blair case might well be cited for the proposition that assignment of an
interest in property is effective of itself to change the taxable person.
However, severe limitations on this case remain to be discussed. And it
has been suggested 43 that the Blair case has no applicability to assign38 The list set forth in Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949)
(quoted at length on page ......
infra), although dealing with a partnership, is typical
of all property thus transferred.
39 For a good example of such construction see Commissioner v. Newman, 159
F.(2d) 848 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 331 U.S. 859 (1947), showing the breadth the
courts will give such powers or possible powers in an intra-family situation.
40 INT. REv. CODE §§ 166, 167.
41 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
42 Id. at 13-14.
43
Soll, supra note 15, at 454. Mr. Soll's contention is that the "transmutation
of a pure income right into an independent property should be limited to those
situations where the congressional alchemists have distilled a rule." The property
concept - that the interest of a beneficiary under a trust is in equity ownership
secundum quid of the assets of which the trust has been declared-has hardly been
of congressional distillation. The writer feels that when the assignment involves any
rights of substantial duration and importance, the rights themselves are property.
On principle, the writer does not feel that the so-called "res test" is of any value
in the attribution area than as an inverse view of the "control" or "ownership"
test. In other words, in a situation where the grantor has retained so much control
over the property which produces the income that he has failed to pass a sufficient
"res," the income -hould justly be taxed to him. There is no real limitation placed
by the "res test" which the "ownership test" does not already impose. Beyond that,
the issue is a mere economic determination of whether income really arises from
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ments of property generally, but rather should be limited to trust situations. The writer disagrees. On principle, there seems to be no reason for
distinguishing the grantor's ownership in a situation where he owns the
property directly as compared with the situation where his ownership is
"strained" through the medium of a trustee.
A severe limitation was imposed upon the rule of the Blair case a
short time later in Helvering v. Horst.44 In that case the owner of bonds
detached negotiable interest coupons from them shortly before their due
date and delivered them as a gift to his son. The bonds themselves were
retained. The donor was taxed on the income when it was received by
the son. The rationale of the decision was indeed broad: the assignor, by
assigning the coupons, had enjoyed the income, and, without receiving
money, had received money's worth in satisfaction. The decision embodied a refusal to treat the coupons as property in their own right, and
a failure to distinguish interest which had accrued prior to the transfer
from that which accrued while the donee was owner. (The latter amount
was apparently insignificant). To be noted is the short duration of any
interest which the donation of the coupons gave the son in the underlying
property, the bonds themselves.
Harrisonv. Schaffner 45 further cuts the Blair recognition of the ability
of a parent to shift income taxes by shifting interests in property to
members of his family. The taxpayer in that case, beneficiary of a testamentary trust, assigned portions of the income from that trust for the
following year, and that year only, to certain of her children. Again, the
choice of the taxable person was involved. The assignor was taxed. The
disposition was held, for income tax purposes, not a gift of property, but
merely a gift of income. A single year's equitable interest in the trust
res was not sufficient to be recognized as any measure of ownership in the
underlying property. Said the Court:

46

But we think it quite another matter to say that the beneficiary of a
trust who makes a single gift of a sum of money payable out of the income
of the trust does not realize income when the gift is effectuated by payment, or that he escapes the tax by attempting to clothe the transaction
in the guise of a transfer of trust property rather than the transfer of
income, where that is its obvious purpose and effect.

Drawing the line between a Blair transfer and a Harrisonv. Schaffner
transfer, the court quite frankly admitted, might pose difficulties: 11
the rights parted with, or from some other source. Nor has anyone doubted that
the Clifford doctrine, also arising from a trust situation, is equally applicable in a
non-trust situation. See Hawaiian Trust Co. v. Kanne, 172 F.(2d) 74 (9th Cir.
1949).
44 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
45 312 U.S. 579 (1941).
46 Id. at 582.
47 Id. at 583.

NOTES
It is enough that we find in the present case that the taxpayer, in point
of substance, has parted with no substantial interest in property other than
the specified payments of income which, like other gifts of income, are
taxable to the donor.

"Property" as a concept throughout the law has retained the perhaps
fortunate characteristic of being a "nomen generalissimum," a broad
term which means different things for different purposes. 48 A bond
coupon in the Horst case, and a single year's equitable estate in a trust
in the Schaffner case, were not property of such character as to warrant
attribution of income to them. And where the property consists of merely a right in gross to receive income, it has no standing in an attribution
case. Obviously the property in connection with the interest in Horst
was the bond itself; and even though a single's equitable estate in a trust
may in equity, when a trust or property problem is posed, be property,
it was not a sufficient property in the assets of the trust to warrant the
attribution of income to it. In either the Horst or the Schaffner case no
substantial measure of the underlying inc6me-producing property was
transferred to the child. Of even further significance is the brevity of the
period involved.
Additional light is shed upon this latter aspect by the doctrine arising
from the case of Helvering v. Clifford,49 wherein a husband declared for
his wife's benefit a short term trust (five 'years) of securities owned by
himself. The husband was trustee and in that capacity had complete
administrative control over the trust. The income was payable to the
wife to the extent that the husband, as trustee, in his absolute discretion
might determine, and the reversionary interest remained with the husband.
The husband was taxed under Section 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue
Code. Three factors were controlling: (1) a reversionary interest after
a short-term grant; (2) the power to control the beneficial enjoyment
of the income or corpus; and (3) broad administrative control. Any one
factor, said the Court,50 would not normally be decisive. But the Clifford
Regulations 51 which followed as an aftermath of this decision would use
any one of these on a dogmatic basis. Thus, ten years, or fifteen where
the beneficiary is not an exempt organization, was set up as the limit
before which attribution would not be changed. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, has very recently quashed
48 12 ENcyc. Soc. Sci., Property 528 (1937). See also Schuster v. Helvering,
121 F.(2d) 643, 645 (2d Cir. 1941).

49

309 U. S. 331 (1940).

Id. at 336.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-21 (1945). See Pavenstedt, The Treasury
Legislates: The Distortion of the Clifford Rule, 2 TAX L. Rlv. 7 (1946), and
compare Eisenstein, The Clifford Regulations and the Heavenly City of Legislative
50

61

Intention, 2 TAx L. Rav. 327 (1947).
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any such hope on the part of the Treasury for certainty and administrative convenience by calling such limitation unconstitutional. 52
Even though a conclusive period, if this decision is adhered to, cannot be used, it nevertheless remains true that time is a vital factor. On
principle, it would seem that the mere factor of time, standing alone,
should not change the attribution of income, but rather should be suggestive, along with other factors, of too much retention of control to
permit taxation to the grantee as the owner.
A myriad of cases have applied the principles of the Clifford decision. 53
Generally, each case has been dealt with on its facts by the Tax Court,
and generalizations beyond the broad doctrine are difficult to make.
Reference will, however, be made to some of these cases in subsequent
sections of this article.
The impact of the above cases has been to center litigation around
Internal Revenue Code Section 22 (a), the general definition of income,
under which these cases arose. Several remaining principles of attribution, less difficult in theory, but of at least equal importance for present
purposes remain for discussion.
Even before the present Section 166 of the Internal Revenue Code
was enacted, it was established that a power of revocation with respect
to the corpus rendered the settlor taxable on any property thus incompletely transferred. 54 Under Section 166 a power to revest the corpus,
held either by the grantor alone, the grantor and another person, or another person alone, provided that the other person does not have a
substantial adverse interest, 55 renders the grantor taxable on the income
from the trust. No limitation of time within which this power may be
exercised is stipulated. A power to revest the corpus at the end of five
years has been held to be within the rule. 56 Even though the wording of
the present Regulations would suggest that a contingent power is within
7
the rule, the cases have held to the contrary.1
It is interesting to observe the potential difference in result where the
interest of the beneficiary is limited by an express power to revoke after
the expiration of a stipulated period of time, as compared with a grant
for the certain period with a reversion retained in the grantor. Only the
Clifford doctrine's operation will tax the grantor in connection with his
52

Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.(2d) 94 (7th Cir. 1953).

For some of the more important, see Roberts, Recent Decisions Involving
Attribution of Income for Tax Purposes, 25 N.Y.U.L. REv. 810 (1950).
54 Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930).
53

55
21

For a discussion of the concept, see Brunner, Substantial Adverse Interests,

TAXES 385 (1943).
56 Helvering v. Dunning,

118 F.(2d) 341 (4th Cir. 1941).
Commissioner v. Betts, 123 F.(2d) 534 (7th Cir. 1941); Commissioner v.
O'Keeffe, 118 F.(2d) 639, 642 (1st. Cir. 1941) ; Corning v. Commissioner, 104 F.(2d)
329, 332 (6th Cir. 1939).
57

NOTES
retained reversion, whereas if the same operative effect is achieved with
respect to the duration of the beneficiary's interest by a retained power
to revoke at the end of a stipulated period, it is very possible that the
grantor will be taxed without any reference to any of the Clifford tests.
The Supreme Court has held, moreover, in a case which was companion
to the Clifford case, that Section 166 is inapplicable in situations involving a retained reversion.58
Douglas v. Willcuts5 9 established the proposition that income, even
though not actually received by the grantor or in fact used to discharge
his obligations, but instead actually received by the beneficiary whose
interest was subject to this contingency, was nevertheless taxable to the
grantor. The holding in this case has been codified in Section 167,60
which provides that if the grantor has the power to divert income to
himself, he will be taxed on the income. A contingent possibility of
diversion to the grantor is sufficient. 61 Accumulation of income which
may, upon the happening of some contingency, be paid or used for the
benefit of the grantor is thus taxable to him. It makes no difference that
the income was not actually so used, if it could have been. It has been
that where the contingency is too remote, the grantor will
held, however,
62
not be taxed.
Of particular moment is Section 167(c). Without 167(c), as was the
case when Helvering v. Stuart 63 was decided, the rules in Section 167 (a)
(1) and (2) would tax the grantor where the trust income could be used,
even by trustees other than the grantor himself, for the support and
maintenance of the grantor's minor children. This was so because such
use would inure to the grantor's benefit, being the discharge of one of
his obligations, and applied even though no income was actually so used.
Section 167(c) limits this taxability in situations where the power exists
in a trustee (but not in the grantor in his individual capacity) to the
extent that the income was in fact used in satisfaction of the grantor's
obligation to support. Thus saved is a common and salutary provision in
trusts drafted for the benefit of children.
It is to be noted, however, that Section 167(c) is limited to income
which can be used to discharge support obligations. Income which can
be otherwise used for the grantor's benefit remains taxable.
58

Helvering v. Wood, 309 U.S. 344 (1940).

59

296 U.S. 1 (1935).
Note that Section 166 above discussed relates to powers retained with respect

60

to corpus.
61
Helvering v. Evans, 126 F.(2d) 270 (3rd Cir. 1942) (if needed for support);
Altmaier v. Commissioner, 116 F.(2d) 162 (6th Cir. 1940) (contingency of surviving wife).
62 Baker v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 1029 (1941).
63 317 U.S. 154 (1942).
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Realization
In the cases and statutory provisions in the area of attribution dealt
with thus far, the writer has attempted to define the areas in which a
gift can be used to secure a reallocation of income. Before a consideration of particular classes of property is undertaken, however, it seems
advisable to deal with the problem of realization in its bearing upon the
problem of attribution. This interjection is made at this point because
of the materiality of this consideration in the partnership and personal
service product cases.
With respect to donated property, the present statutory scheme is designed to tax the donee of property on both pre-gift and post-gift
appreciation. Thus Internal Revenue Code Section 113(a) (2) provides
that the basis of property acquired by gift after December 31, 1920,
shall have the same basis in the hands of the donee as it had in the
donor's hands.
Realization is the "judicial proclamation of a taxable event." 64 Thus,
even though there has been an increment in the value of property, that
gain is not to be recognized until it has been "realized" - until some
"closed transaction" establishes the gain in the form, normally, of cash
or property of a different character. 65
Section 113(a) (2) has resulted generally in a nonrecognition of the
donative disposition of property as an occasion for the realization of
income, and this is true whether the property involved was a capital
asset or a non-capital asset. 66
However, realization, like attribution, is an area primarily of judicial
rather than statutory doctrine. Thus, realization is nowhere specifically
defined in the Code. Realization, normally taking the form of a sale, may
take the form of some "other disposition." It is conceivable that "other
gifts, 67 but
disposition" could be construed broadly enough to include
68
trade.
taxable
a
to
generally
limited
been
has
thus far it
There is to be discerned, however, a movement in the cases toward
recognition of the gift itself as an occasion for the realization of such
income as accrued up to the date of the gift. 69 This movement, although
64 See Soil, Intra-Family Assignments: Attribution and Realization of Income
(second installment), 7 TAx L. REv. 68 (1951).
65- Or such gain might be accrued and more or less incontrovertible right to
receive cash or other property. See North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286
U.S. 417, 424 (1932).
66 The realization cases make no distinction between capital assets and noncapital assets realizations. Thus, Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931), dealing with
a capital asset, freely employed non-capital asset cases.
67 Soil, supra note 64, at 77.
68

Id. at 78.

69 See Note, Gratuitous Disposition of Property as Realization of Income, 62
HARv. L. REv. 1181 (1949).

NOTES
it finds no clear rejection, also finds no recognition in the Supreme Court
cases, unless in isolated statements.7"
The relation of the doctrine of realization to that of attribution is
nowhere better pointed out than in the problem posed in I. T. 3932.7 1
There, a father, who was in the business of raising cattle, made a complete and bona fide gift to his son of some half-grown cattle. At the time
of the gift to his son there had been a considerable increment in their
value. The son kept them for an additional period, increasing their value,
and they were finally sold. The basis of the cattle in the father's hands
was zero. On traditional attribution and basis rules, unless Horst stands
for as broad a proposition as the Commissioner there contended, 72 the
father should be taxed on nothing, and the cattle should have a zero
basis in the son's hands. The income, then, upon sale, would be taxed
entirely to the son - possibly even as a capital gain, if the son was not
himself in the business of raising cattle.73
On the other hand, if there was some defect in the transfer of economic
ownership or an inordinate retention of control, a bland application of
the doctrine thus far advanced would suggest that the father be taxed
on the entire amount.
The position of I.T. 3932 is that the income should be taxed to the
donor up to the date of transfer, and thereafter taxed to the son. It is
submitted that the position of I.T. 3932 is the sound solution to harmony
in the attribution doctrine. A distinction between income already accrued and income to accrue after the transfer is consistent with the
economics underlying the entire judicial doctrine in this area. As has
been suggested 74 a statutory provision seems appropriate to implement
the doctrine as it now stands.
It will be noted, however, that a change in the realization concept on
the gift of property would bring about a change, unless specific exception
were made, to the very interesting results which may be achieved in the
instance of a gift of appreciated property to charity. 75 Whether this
exception should be made as an additional inducement to aid private
charity is a discussion beyond the scope of this paper.
70 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 117 (1940): "Even though he never receives the money, he derives money's worth from the disposition of the coupons....
71 1948-2 Cum. BuLL. 7. See also I.T. 3910, 1948-1 Cmr. BuI,. 15.
72 The contention as to the Horst case made in I.T. 3932 refers to the Commissioner's position in I.T. 3910. The contention in both is that the case stands for
realization by giving.
73 INT. RIv. CODE § 117(a). Capital assets are all property held by the taxpayer
with the exception of merchandise, land and depreciable property used in trade or
business, and other exceptions not material here.
74 Soll, supra note 64, at 81.
75 See Clark, How to Get the Most Out of the Deduction for Charitable Contributions by Individuals and Business, 6 N.Y.U. INsT. 1015 (1948).
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The Problems of the PartnershipInterest
There have been, perhaps, no muddier waters in the entire field of tax
litigation than the family partnership controversies. The number of such
controversies is, or soon will be, legion.
The history of this litigation, and the present congressional solution
is significant for two reasons: First of all, the gift of a partnership
interest is one of the most tax-desirable gifts of income producing
property that can be made, and is thus important in itself; secondly, the
pattern of this litigation and legislation is significant in bearing upon
the solution of allied problems involving income producing property. To
this writer, there seems a movement to be discerned toward the greater
attribution of income to the transferees of property transferred within
the family group, even when property other than a partnership interest
is involved. The Blair76 decision, in short, still has unsuspected vitality.

In the typical family partnership arrangement, one finds emphasized
in bold relief the most perplexing difficulties in intra-family assignments.
The business involved is frequently one which a father has established
or in which he has been a dominant factor. After the gift, he is prone to
remain in about the same position with respect to the whole business.
Formerly, the new family partner attempted to perform "vital services"
and serve a real "business purpose." 77 We shall consider to what extent
7
these things - often reduced to mere sham " - remain necessary.
Perhaps the earliest attack on the family partnership is embodied in
Burnet v. Leininger79 in which the taxpayer, who owned a one-half
interest in a partnership, agreed with his wife that she should be an
"equal partner" in that interest. The taxpayer was nevertheless taxed
upon his full distributive share and the wife was not regarded as being a
partner in any sense. The Court followed the Earl 80 decision very closely
in arriving at this result.
8
The cases of Lusthaus v. Commissioner and Commissioner v.
82
Tower, decided in the Supreme Court in 1946, shedimportant light on
the problem. The Tower case involved a transfer to a wife of shares of
stock in a controlled corporation with the understanding that she would
place the assets in a partnership to be formed. The partnership was
formed, but held to be invalid for tax purposes. The test which was
seized upon from this decision for the solution of partnership problems
was: 83
76
77

(1952).

Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
Dierberger, Income Splitting and Family Partnerships,30 TAXEs 515, 516-7

78

Id. at 517. Note several amusing instances cited.

79
80
81

285 U.S. 136 (1932).
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
327 U.S. 293 (1946).
327 U.S. 280 (1946).

82
83

Id. at 290.

NOTES
If she either invests capital originating with her or substantially contributes to the control and management of the business, or otherwise
performs vital additional services, or does all of these things she may be
a partner....

The converse became the test: no original capital and no vital services
yielded no income reallocation. Housewives were hard pressed to perform those vital services periodically and tracing partnership capital to
the wife originally was often an impossible task. 4 Partnerships with
children were virtually impossible because of the requirement of original
capital contributions.
Commissioner v. Culbertsons 5 rather unexpectedly 6 opened a new
chapter in 1949. In that case a rancher had accepted his sons as partners
on the basis of their promissory notes. Several of these sons had little
connection with the operation of the ranch at the time, but there seemed
to be intentions of a future close connection. The issue to be decided was
whether an intention to contribute capital and services in the future
would validate a partnership of this kind for tax purposes.
The Court, however, went beyond the bare issue of the case, and in
view of the harsh results which followed the application of the standards
gleaned by the lower courts from the Tower case, undertook to clarify its
position. A "clarified" test of family partnership existence was set
forth: 87
The question is not whether the services or capital contributed by a
partner are of sufficient importance to meet some objective standard
supposedly established by the Tower case, but whether, considering all the
facts - the agreement, the conduct of the parties in execution of its
provisions, their statements, the testimony of disinterested persons, the
relationship of the parties, their respective abilities and capital contributions, the actual control of income and the purposes for which it is used,
and any other facts throwing light on their true intent - the parties in
good faith and acting with a business purpose intended to join together in
the present conduct of the enterprise. [Italics mine]

The requirements of original capital as essential to recognition of the
partnership was directly attacked, and it was concluded that its absence
was "not conclusive" although its absence had the effect of "placing a
heavy burden on the taxpayers to show the bona fide intent of the
parties to join together as partners." 88
It was clear that no simple solution had emerged from the Culbertson
decision by the subsequent developments in that very case. Remanded
to the Tax Cdurt, the same result as had been originally obtained was
Dierberger, supra note 77, at 516-17; Lifton, supra note 1, at 465.
85 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
88 It was expected that the Court would merely clarify the existing "tests" in
the area of a future intention to contribute capital.
87 Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949).
88
Id. at 744.
84

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
reached

89 -

that the Culbertson partnership was not a partnership for

income tax purposes. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit again reversed the Tax Court.90
Cases subsequent to the Culbertson case further indicate that the air
had not been completely cleared of pre-Cudbertson doctrine. Varying
weight was given to the original capital and the services 91 aspects. The
law became more fluid, and the cases were clothed in language of
intent 92 and business purpose9 3 as well as on the basis of ownership
criterion. 94
Section 340 of the Revenue Act of 195195 amended the Internal
Revenue Code with respect to partnerships in two places. Section 3797
(a) (2) contains the definition of a partner. Added to this definition was
a statement providing that a person is to be recognized as a partner for
income tax purposes if he owns a capital interest in a partnership in
which capital is a material income-producing factor, whether or not such
capital interest was acquired by purchase or gift from any other person.
Secondly, Supplement F, the partnership supplement, was amended
by the addition of the present Section 191.96
The purpose of these provisions, the Committee Report said, 97 was "to
harmonize the rules governing interests in the so-called family partnership with those generally applicable to other forms of property or business." The principles of attribution of income are to be applied to family
partnerships irrespective of the business benefit or lack of it to the
particular partnership involved. Immediately one thinks of the sugWilliam 0. Culbertson, Sr., P-H 1950 TC MEm. DEc. ff50,187 (1950).
Culbertson v. Commissioner, 194 F.(2d) 581 (5th Cir. 1952).
91 An analysis of post-Culbertson cases can be found in Packel, supra note 6, at
155-57.
92 E.g. W. F. Harmon, 13 T.C. 373 (1949).
93 Greenberger v. Commissioner, 177 F.(2d) 990 (7th Cir. 1949).
94 E.g. McPhillips v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.Ala. 1949).
95 65 STAT. 511 (1951).
96 The provisions of this section were aptly paraphrased by Dierberger, supra
note 77, at 518:
"(1) In the case of any partnership interest created by gift, the allocable share
of the income of the donee under the partnership agreement is to be recognized as
the donee's income except
(a) When the shares are allocated without the allowance of reasonable compensation for services rendered by the donor to the partnership and except
(b) to the extent that the allocation to the donated capital is proportionately
greater than that allocated to the donor's capital.
"(2)
The distributive share of a partner in the earnings will not be diminished
because of absence due to military service.
"(3)
Any interest purchased by one member of a family from another is treated
as a gift from the seller and as donated capital in the amount of its fair value. For
this purpose the family of an individual includes his spouse, ancestors, lineal
descendants and any trust for the primary benefit of such persons."
97 H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1951).
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gestion in the Culbertson case that a testing of motives be made, and of
the remaining applicability of the Gregory doctrine9" in this area.
The statute enunciates no really new principles of income attribution.
The Committee Report makes it clear that it was not intended to, but
rather was presented to clear some of the post-Culbertson confusion.
More specifically, the provisions were aimed at family partnerships in
which the interest of one or more of the members was acquired by gift.
It reaffirms the proposition that if the transferee really owns the interest
- the income-producing property - income shall be attributed to it.
Capital must be a material income-producing factor in the business.
This is no more than to say that the property, the partnership interest,
must be income producing before income can be attributed to it. An
interest in a purely service business is therefore excluded.
It is hoping too much to expect that these provisions will alleviate to
any great extent the amount of litigation in the family partnership area.
As has been pointed out, there are gaps for judicial speculation.99 The
attack on any partnership interest on the basis of the "ownership test"
remains open. The donor must make a fairly clean transfer. Good faith
is still necessary, as always. And the matter of retained control, and the
incidence of the Clifford doctrine in this area, are clearly to be expected
as limitations.
Besides controversy in the preliminary analysis as to whether the
ownership has truly been transferred for tax purposes, which will undoubtedly follow the Clifford approach, the lack of standards for determining when capital is a material income-producing factor will occasion
difficulty. 100 This is, however, primarily a matter of economic analysis
of the business involved, and to expect precise statutory standards on
this subject would probably be to expect magic. Several pre-1951 cases,
however, suggest a caveat. 1' 1 The precedent value of these cases is
doubtful, of course, both because of their pre-1951 vintage, and also
because of the failure of the courts to attempt
allocation either in the
02
attribution cases or in the partnership cases.'
In view of our analysis thus far, both with respect to income-producing
property generally, and specifically a partnership interest, there seems
to be no reason why a child cannot be owner, even an outright owner, of
98 The business purpose doctrine as based on the decision in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
99 Liften stresses these "gaps." Lifton, supra note 1, at 471, 476.
10
See Smith, Shifting Income Within the Family Group, 30 TAXEs 995, 998

(1952).

101 See notes 24-29 supra and accompanying text. See also Lyman A. Stanton,
14 T.C. 217 (1950).
102 See Robinson, The Allocation Theory in Family PartnershipCases, 25 TAX=s
963 (1947), discussing the difficulty with which any allocation attempts have met.
See also Lifton, supra note 1, at 473.
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such property for tax purposes. On principle, it should make no difference whether the property is owned directly, owned by a beneficiary
under a trust, or by a ward under a guardianship arrangement.
As a practical matter, however, where material amounts are involved,
in view of the severe tests as to ownership and control to which such
transfers are subjected, it may be very desirable to attempt these dispositions through a trust or, if appropriate, a guardianship device. Particularly is this true where the donee is a minor child who cannot be
shown competent to manage property and participate in ownership
activities. It is not thought that the fact of legal disability will preclude
treatment of the child as owner. His natural limitations are perhaps more
material. A parent who would profess to have given property to a child
which he nevertheless manages and deals with as veritable owner, even
if he considers himself as a sort of trustee and acts only in the child's
interests, may nevertheless find himself with an insurmountable burden
of proof in the Tax Court.
If the advisable solution, where the amounts involved justify the expense, is to have a third person manage the income producing property
on a fiduciary basis for the child, a problem arises when a partnership
interest is the property sought to be transferred.
Can a partnership interest be placed in trust for a child? At first
blush, several objections appear. At common law, a trustee is severely
limited as to his capacity to contract. Clearly nowhere could a trustee
contract in such a way as to make beneficiaries liable as general partners.
Moreover, the traditional definition of a partnership as well as that
under the Uniform Partnership Act,10 3 does not seem broad enough to
contemplate a trust as a partner.
As to the capacity of the trustee to contract, the unlimited liability of
general partners is not an insurmountable difficulty. While the trustee
could not contract so as to bind the beneficiaries to unlimited liability,
the trustee himself may be willing to undertake this liability in consideration of fees to be received for his risks and services.' 0 4 Or an indemnity agreement might be worked out to save the trustee harmless in the
event of the insolvency of the partnership. And most practical of all,
there is the device of the limited partnership, which is available in most
states.
Whether a trust may undertake this relationship is basically an issue
for state law to resolve, but there seems to be no reason in principle why
a trustee, given sufficient power in the trust instrument, cannot be a
person within the meaning of that term under the Uniform Partnership
05
Act.'
103 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 6(1): "A partnership is an association of two
or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."
104 As he would have to if he attempted to contract so broadly with respect to
the trust estate. See 2 ScoTT, TRusTs § 262(1939).

NOTES
For tax purposes, it is to be noted that the definition of a partnership,1°6 like that of a corporation, 10 7 is broader than traditional "legal"
definitions.
The issue of whether a trust can be a partner has received considerable attention in the Tax Court and the lower federal courts in recent
months. In the Tax Court, the trust has generally been accepted, at least
to the extent that the bare fact that the partner is a trust is not sufficient
to preclude its treatment as a partner for tax purposes. The Stern case 0 s
so held in 1950; two 1952 cases, Sultan 1o1 and Brodhead,110 are in
accord. A 1953 case, the Shainberg case Il even had implications for a
professional business in that regard.
2
However, Hanson v. Birmingham,"1
a case in an Iowa Federal District Court, reached an opposite result, stressing the character of a
partnership at common law and its apparent inconsistency with a trust
relationship. In 1953, the Ninth Circuit apparently reached the same
result in Toor v. Westover," 3 but whether this is really so is doubtful,
since the court in that case probably based its decision more on the
bundle of rights the taxpayer retained," 4 than on the mere fact that a
trust relationship was involved, even though the court added that it was
not impressed by the tax court's reasoning in Sultan and Brodhead."5
It seems probable that in the near future a definitive ruling that a
trust may be a partner will appear on the scene. Mim. 6767, for example,
states: 116
The bureau does not adhere to the view that a trustee cannot in any
circumstances become a partner for tax purposes, regardless of some
judicial expressions of such a rule.

So too, the amendments proposed to conform the Regulations to the 1951
partnership provisions (to be discussed in detail later) definitely contemplate a trust relationship as a partner.
United States Treasury Regulations 114 § 29.191-1 et seq." 7 warrant
special attention both as implementing the statutory provisions previous105 UiFORpPARtERmsm AcT § 2: "Person includes individuals, partnerships,
corporations, and other associations."
106

INT. Rv.

107
108

Id. § 3797(a)(3).

CODE §

3797(a) (2).

Theodore D. Stern, 15 T.C. 521 (1950) (five judges dissenting).
109 Edward D. Sultan, 18 T.C. No. 86, P-H 1952 TC R . DEC. ff 18.86 (1952).
110 Thomas H. Brodhead, 18 T.C. No. 87, P-H 1952 TC RE. DEc. ff 18.87
(1952).
111 Herbert Shainberg, P-H 1953 TC Mm. DEC. ff 53,068 (1953).
112 92 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Iowa 1950), appeal dismissed, 190 F.(2d) 206 (8th
Cir. 1951).
113 200 F.(2d) 713, 716-17 (9th Cir. 1952).
114 Id. at 715-17.
115 Id. at 717.
116 1952-1 Cum. BULL. 111, 118.
117 Promulgated in 17 FED. Ro. 11663 (1952).
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ly dealt with, and as indicating the Treasury Department's position on
the meaning and implications of these provisions.
Section 29.19 1-1 (a) (3) requires that the transaction be bona fide, and
not mere sham if a partnership is to be created by one member of a
family for another. It is also stated, however, that motive and business
purpose, generally speaking, are immaterial. 118 The suggestion of the
importance of these things in the Culbertson decision' 19 is therefore rejected. It is hoping too much, perhaps, to expect these considerations to
be completely removed from the judicial analysis of a transaction as
being either real or sham. At least, it seems quite doubtful that an extension of the Gregory doctrine will ever find its way into the family
partnership decisions.
As to the question of what sort of a partnership interest can be one in
which capital is a material income-producing factor, the Regulations give
but little help. A mere right in gross to receive a share of profits is not
such an interest as will be recognized. 2 0 Underlying this right must be
an ownership of an undivided interest in business assets to which some
portion of a given business' profit can economically be ascribed. The
Regulations suggest that where the income of a business consists principally of fees, commissions, or other compensation for personal services,
no such interest exists. 12 1 Where, however, substantial inventories or investment in plant, machinery, or equipment are involved, the capital will
be regarded as income producing property. 122 Application of this standard to particular businesses may pose some difficulties123 but the scheme
seems quite clear on principle.
As anticipated, the Regulations expressly reserve the issue of whether
the ownership has in truth and in fact been transferred, and suggest only
that it will be determined in the light of all the facts and circumstances
of the case.124 So-too, the issue of retention of control, direct or indirect,
comes in for distinct comment. Indirect control is at least as dangerous
as direct control, and the burden of proof on such an issue may be even
more difficult to sustain. It will normally be evidenced by conduct
acquiesced in by the purported donee. 1 25 That a tax counsel must give
careful advice to a client contemplating a family partnership arrangement in respect to this particular problem is at once obvious.
Several significant examples of directly retained control are mentioned
in the Regulations 126 and warrant special mention. None of these, it is
U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.191-1(b) (10) (1952).
Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
120 Accord, Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
121 U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.191-1 (a) (4) (1952).
122 Ibid.
123 See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
124 U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.191-1(b) (1) (1952).
125 Id. § 29.191-1(b) (3).
126 Id. § 29.191-1(b) (2).
118

110
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said, is alone conclusive. Control over the distribution of income is first
mentioned. To avoid question on the basis of such a retention of control,
it seems wise to incorporate into the partnership agreement a precise
formula for the division of profits, and leave the right of withdrawal
fairly unfettered.
Secondly, a retained control restricting the right of the donee to withdraw and sell his interest is mentioned. 127 Also cited as an example of
retained power inconsistent with a proper family partnership arrangement is the retention of ownership by the donor of certain assets essential
to the business.128 It is quite obvious that retention of the ownership of
certain vital assets of a business could render effectively revocable a
partnership which on its face seem quite solid.
Finally, the retention of managerial powers is cited.129 Managerial
powers, to some extent, can be retained. But where these powers are inconsistent with normal relations among partners, the partnership will
probably fall under the attack of the Bureau.
It is specifically mentioned that a trustee may be a partner under the
new provisions. 130 He may not, however, be so subjected to the will of
the grantor as to limit his exercise of control to a mere reflection of the
grantor's wishes. Limited partnerships in this regard, as in a non-trust
family partnership arrangement, will be recognized .if they are valid
under state law.131
Section 29.191-1 (b) (8) is perhaps most significant of all. It sets forth
in express terms what tax advisers have probably suspected for some
time in dealing with the interests of minor children. It is here expressly
provided that except where it is shown that a minor child is competent
(presumably in terms of natural rather than legal ability) to manage
property and participate in activity in respect of property befitting an
owner, the minor's interest will not be recognized unless the enjoyment
of such interest is exercised by another as fiduciary for the sole benefit
of the child. tse of the income from the partnership to support the child,
in conformance with Internal Revenue Code Section 167, is use for the
parent's rather than the child's benefit.
A theoretical argument against such a position may be made. A parent
may be able to establish and maintain an impartiality in his relationship
with his child in this connection such as would become a trustee. Visintainer v. Commissioner,132 for example, might be cited to show situations
in which the courts have not required a third person in the relationship
127

128
129
130
131
132

Id. § 29.191-1(b)
Id. § 29.191-1(b)
Id. § 29.191-1(b)
Id. § 29.191-1(b)

(2) (ii).
(2) (iii).
(2) (iv).
(7).
Id. § 29.191-1(b) (9).
187 F.(2d) 519 (10th Cir. 1951).
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to sustain it. It might even be submitted that this position will not be
inflexibly sustained any more
than the Clifford Regulations have been
138
followed as absolute rules.
Administrative convenience, however, strongly suggests the above rule,
and the tax counsel is much less apt to find himself faced with a most
difficult burden of proof in an unprofitable tax controversy if he follows it.
The Products of PersonalServices
Where property assigned within a family group is property which is
specifically the product of the personal efforts of the assignor, very
difficult problems of income attribution arise. The tentative draft of the
American Law Institute' 3 4 regards an assignment of such property as
ineffectual to change the taxable person.
The producer of a patent, a copyright, or a franchise may assign such
property to a child, or a trustee for a child, and the child or trustee may
in turn license its use for stipulated royalties. Shall the income thus
received be taxable to the producer of the property on the theory that
ultimately, he earned it, or shall it be taxable to the assignee on the
theory that the ownership of the property was adequately transferred,
without the retention of control, and the property itself produced the
income? Stated in another form, shall the approach be that the assignment involved merely an assignment of the right to receive income, demanding a Eubank 135 analysis and solution, or shall the assignment be
regarded as one of income producing property, requiring attribution to
the assignee? Strains of either approach are to be found in the cases.
And even under the latter approach, the Commissioner may attack the
reality of the transfer on the basis of retention of control.
Outstanding in this area is Commissioner v. Sunnen 36 where the inventor had assigned to his wife certain license contracts relating to the
patents he had produced. The licensee under these contracts, however,
was a corporation over which the transferor had substantial control.
Moreover, the corporation had a power to cancel the contracts, and the
ultimate power to control the amount of the royalty. In addition, the
license contracts were not exclusive. Under these circumstances, the
Court did not find it necessary to meet the taxpayer's contention that
the right assigned was property itself capable of producing income. The
Court merely invoked the ownership and retention of control tests, and
found such retention through the medium of the corporate device as to
preclude treating the assignee as owner.
See Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.(2d) 94 (7th Cir. 1953).
134 INCoME TAX STATUTE A.L.I. 8 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1949).
135 Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940). See note 23 supra and accom133

panying text.
136

333 U.S. 591 (1948).
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37
In Straus v. Commissioner,1
the taxpayer, as a result of his personal
services, had received a right to receive a percentage of royalties paid for
the use of certain processes produced in part by him. The taxpayer assigned this interest to his wife. Nevertheless he was taxed on the royalties. The Eubank approach was utilized. The interest of the taxpayer in
the process was never more than a contract right to be paid a certain
sum in exchange for past services, and this contract right
could not be
38
property capable in its own right of producing income.1

Some created rights, however, can be property. Recognition of this
fact is to be found in the Code itself. 1 39 The copyright decisions, whether
for the taxpayer or against him, have generally utilized the property
approach, and in testing the propriety of attribution to one other than
the producer have looked to the completeness of the transfer.
Lewis v. Rothensies 40 involved an assignment of royalties by an
author to his children. The court explicitly worked on the premise that
the royalties were the fruit of an income producing property, rather than
a mere return for the personal services of the author: 141
When an author writes a book the literary ideas embodied in the manuscript are property. When he sells it in exchange for royalties his interest
in the contract by which the royalties are paid is property. Of course, the
book came into being by his personal service (a term by no means restricted to services rendered by virtue of an employer-employee relationship), but so do many other kinds of income-producing property. For
example, a man may build, entirely by his own labor, a boat or a wagon
or a barn. If he did so and rented what he had to others, it would hardly
be contended that the income was income derived from compensation for
personal service.

Nonetheless, the author and not his children paid the taxes on the
royalties.
'The cases of Wodenhouse v. Commissioner, wherein two circuits
reached opposite results based on assignments by the same author of
manuscripts produced by him, both, nevertheless, embody a property
approach to the attribution problem. In the Second Circuit, 142 the court
held that the assignment would stand for tax purposes, the court stating
that although the husband created the story, the wife's right to receive
royalties was not created by him. The Fourth Circuit, 1 43 in reaching a
contrary result, based its decision with respect to the manuscript assignment on the retention of control by the author.
137
138

139
140

168 F.(2d) 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 858 (1948).
For a good analytical discussion, see Soil, supra note 15, at 456-57.
E.g. INT. R v. CODE § 117(a) (1) (c).
61 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1944), aff'd per curiam, 150 F.(2d) 959 (3rd Cir.

1945).
141

Ibid.

142

177 F.(2d) 881, 884 (2d Cir. 1949).
178 F.(2d) 987 (4th Cir. 1949).

143

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

The cases in this area have not sufficiently crystallized the law. The
theoretical difficulty is in the realization, not in the attribution area. If
"A" assigns to his child the product of his personal services (or to the
trustee for his benefit) and the child or his trustee then deal with the
property very wisely, on economic principles it is clear that both father
and child have income in the total transaction. There should be a cut-off
at the time of the transfer to the child. The father should be taxed on
the fair value of the product at the time of his transfer to the child, that
being income from his personal services. The son should be taxed on the
income which is the fair return for the use of property which is now his,
as well as any gains resulting from dealing with the property as owner.
As above indicated, this approach is not fully incorporated into the
tax law as yet. 1 4 4 There is a movement in that direction, however' 45
which to this writer seems to harmonize the attribution principles when,
as here income results from both services and property.
Summation
The above pages have dealt with the problems of what interests may
be transferred to a child to secure attribution of income to the child
rather than the father, and in what manner this transfer must be effectuated in order to make it a complete and valid transfer.
The former matter is largely a matter of the economic determination
of the source of income; the latter largely a question of reality. We have
seen the incidence of the Clifford doctrine and must conclude that three
vital factors limit the manner in which a transfer can be made so as to
secure the benefit of income re-allocation: The duration of the interest
must be substantial; control over the administration of the property
must be yielded; finally, there must be no control over the beneficial
enjoyment of the property.
Few occasions have arisen to make explicit distinctions between trust
transfers and non-trust transfers. The Clifford doctrine, of course, arose
in the trust area. On principle, there should be no difference in its
incidence on non-trust transfers, and the courts have occasionally found
its use appropriate in connection with non-trust cases.' 46 It is submitted
that it will find its way into transfers of a partnership interest even where
no trust is involved. But normally, unless a trust is involved in a transfer, there is no way in which the transferor can limit the interests of the
transferee, and a question merely of reality arises. Retained control is of
equal significance in this area. Seldom could the question of limited duration arise apart from a trust, unless in a grant of land, or an unusual
deed gift of personal property.
See Heading "Realization" supra, at page .....
145 See Note, Gratuitous Disposition of Property as Realization of Income,
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NOTES
With respect to the former question, the attributability of income to
the interest or right transferred, it should make no difference who the
transferee is. As to the latter question, the manner in which the transfer
must be affected, the nature of the transferee is of great practical importance.
Where a child is involved, the only safe transfer, if the child is under,
say seventeen or eighteen, is one in trust or one to a guardian for administration for the child's benefit. Such transfers and such administration,
however, are expensive. And if the property is such as to lend itself well
to the child's custody, or unique or clearly identifiable as the child's,
such administration may probably be dispensed with. With respect to a
partnership interest, or property with which administrative action is
necessary (like stocks in a corporation), the use of a third person as
fiduciary, however, is clearly indicated.
Beyond the principles enunciated, the problems as to the actual transfer are problems for the advice of an attorney having knowledge of the
particular character of the property involved and of the particular situation of the donee.
The Gift Tax Annual Exclusion
The remainder of this article will be devoted to the problem of securing the benefit of an annual exclusion in the case of a gift to a child.
In addition to the life-time exemption which a donor has under the
Federal Gift Tax, Internal Revenue Code Section 1003 (b) (3) allows
each donor an exclusion in each year after 1943 of the first three
thousand dollars in gifts "(other than gifts of future interests in
property)" to any person. By use of the split gift provision1 4 7 in a
family situation this amount may be effectively doubled.
Since a tax-wise donor may desire to spread his gifts to his children
over a period of years, the availability of this exclusion in the case of
gifts to minors is very material in determining the tax consequences of
his plan.
The purpose of excluding gifts of future interest was Congressional
apprehension of the administrative difficulty of determining "the number
of eventual donees and the value of their respective gifts." 148
The term "future interest" is not defined in the statute. The Regulations state that the term is a legal one 49 and one case 5 ° says it is a
term "that every man on the street knows of." By the more important
147

INT. R v. CODE § 1000(f).

148 H.R.REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1932).
149 U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.11 (1943).
150 Rheinstrom v. Commissioner, 105 F.(2d) 642, 649 (8th Cir. 1939).
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case law on the subject, however, it is a term sui generis, and not the
same as its predecessor in property law.15'
Whether an interest is future does not depend upon state law or the
vested or contingent nature of a given interest. 1 2 Moreover, every right
in property has present existence as a right.5 3 The determination of
whether an interest is future rests rather upon the issue of whether there
is bestowed a present right of enjoyment in the donee. 154 Thus the
Regulations define future interests as: ". . . interests . . whether vested
or contingent ... which are limited to commence in use, possession, or

enjoyment at some future date or time." Present interest requires "substantial present economic benefit." 155
There is no doubt that an interest of a life beneficiary under a trust
may be a present interest within the meaning of this term under the gift
tax, provided the beneficiary's enjoyment of income is present. The
trustee must have a duty to pay all or a stipulated portion of the income,
and this duty must be unconditional. Where the trustee is to accumulate
income for a certain period of time or it is discretionary with the trustee
whether to pay or to accumulate, there is no present interest. 15 This is
so even though no accumulation is actually made.
However, a present interest under a trust can be shown where the
beneficiary has a right subject to some
demonstrably definite standard
157
which will require present payments.
In the case of a child, however, there is considerable question as to
whether the interest beyond an amount which is capable of being immediately consumed by him, can qualify as a present interest even
though such additional amount may be theoretically available to him at
the present time through the medium of his parent or guardian. The
same doubt exists in the case of outright transfers, although, perhaps, to
a lesser extent.
Almost all of the decisions dealing with the availability of an annual
exclusion have dealt with transfers in trust. In some of these is to be
found express or implied assent to the proposition that a transfer without any trust control retained cannot be a gift of future interest. 1 58 In
151 Fondern v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 20 (1945); United States v. Pelzeri
312 U.S. 399 (1941).
152

United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 403 (1941).

153

RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY § 153,

comment

e (1936).

154 Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 447-49 (1945); Fondern v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18 (1945).
155 Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480, 486 (1946).
156 Cases cited note 154 supra.
157 Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 449 (1945). See also Hessenbruch
v. Commissioner, 178 F.(2d) 785, 787 (3d Cir. 1950).
158 Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.(2d) 118 (7th Cir. 1951); John E.
Daniels, P-H 1951 TC ME!. DEC. ff 51,044 (1951).
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the Daniels case a transfer in trust was regarded as an "essential ingredient" of a future interest, and it was stated that: "If it should be
determined that petitioner made outright gifts to the grandchildren, then
respondent Government's position cannot be sustained." 159
Clearly, this position is too broad. The nature of the interest transferred, even apart from any trust restriction, may preclude present enjoyment. It is clear, for instance, that an outright deed giving a remainder in real property would not bestow a present interest. 60 Neither
vould an assignment of a life insurance policy, or similar interest, where
1 1
there are restrictions on the rights of the assignee under the policy.
The absence of a trust is certainly not conclusive where property is
involved which, of its very nature, involves restrictions on present
enjoyment. But what of non-trust transfers where there are no limitations inherent in the property itself, and the only factor preventing the
child's immediate ability to exhaust or otherwise use the property are his
lack of present needs for the property (since his support, maintenance,
comfort and education are adequately supplied from other quarters),
and his present incapacity to deal with the property as owner?
Under the present state of the law, the question is left unanswered, at
least conclusively.
Presumably, say several of the cases,'1 62 Congress did not intend to discriminate against gifts to minors. And no case has gone so far as to say
that the disabilities of minority should preclude in his case an exclusion
which would be available were some older person involved. Some cases
expressly disavow this situation, and from others its disavowal may be
inferred. 163
Certain statements of the Supreme Court in the Fondern and Disston
cases - cases which on their facts involved trusts - nevertheless suggest that this discrimination does exist. The applicability of these cases
to a non-trust transfer may well be questioned, 64 but the statements
themselves were not so limited. Thus, in the Fondern case: 165
Whatever puts the barrier of a substantial period between the will of the
beneficiary or donee now to enjoy what has been given him and that enjoyment makes the gift one of future interest....
159 John E. Daniels, supra note 158.
160 Rosa A. Howze, 2 T.C. 1254 (1943).
161 Spyros P. Skouras, 14 T.C. 523 (1950). See also Dora Roberts, 2 T.C. 679
(1943) aff'd, 143 F.(2d) 657 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 841 (1945); Commissioner v. Boeing, 123 F.(2d) 86 (9th Cir. 1941).
162 E.g. Fondern v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 29 (1945).
163 Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.(2d) 118, 122 (7th Cir. 1951); John E.
Daniels, P-H 1951 TC MEm. Dac. ff51,044 (1951).
164 See Rogers, Outright Gifts to Minors and the Gift Tax Exclusion, 7 TAx
L. RaV. 84 (1951).
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Note the use of the words "whatever" and "or donee." Can it be said
that "whatever" refers merely to trust limitations, and "or donee" refers
only to beneficiaries under a trust and not to other donees, particularly
in view of the fact that "beneficiary" was used just before the conjunctive? If not, do not the disabilities of a minor represent such a barrier
to his immediate enjoyment of such of the property as is not required
for his immediate needs? 166 And note the Disston limitation upon a
present interest in the case of a trust - the amount that will be needed
for maintenance, education, and support of the minor determines the
extent to which an interest in that income is "present." 167
As above indicated, no case has dealt with the availability of an
exclusion in the case of an outright transfer to a child. To pursue analysis
any further even in this area, we must again look to cases involving
trusts.
Relying, perhaps, on a policy of non-discrimination toward minors,
trust drafters have frequently inserted in instruments, in order to make
the beneficiary-child's interest present, a provision enabling the child
(usually through his guardian) to call for the entire res or income.
In the case of Kieckhefer v. Commissioner,168 the Seventh Circuit
recognized such a provision as sufficient to take the gift out of the "future
interest" class, but the Tax Court and the Second Circuit, relying on the
Fondern and Disston cases, disagree with Kieckkefer and reach a conclusion completely at variance with it.16 9 For, while the facts may be
distinguishable in70 the case of Stijel v. Commissioner, the rationale is
clearly opposed.'
Mere availability of the property is not sufficient under the Stilel rule.
There must be someone who can effectively make the property available;
that someone must be in existence, and be free of control by the grantor.
But if, under the Stifel rule, there must be some third person to impartially see to the minor's enjoyment of the property, it might still be
doubted on principle whether even an outright gift to a child will qualify
for an exclusion, in the instance where he is incapable of making an
effective consumption of the property.
Beyond this, the law is speculation. The writer, however, finds it difficult to believe that the courts, faced with an outright transfer of property
to a child would deny an exclusion. And it seems quite clear that if the
166
See the view of Fleming that they do. Fleming, Gifts for the Benefit oj
Minors, 49 MIcH. L. REV. 529 (1951); also, Fleming, A Different View of Outright
Gifts to Minors, 7 TAX L. REV. 89 (1951).
167 325 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1945).
168 189 F.(2d) 118 (7th Cir. 1951).
169 Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.(2d) 107 (2d Cir. 1952), affirming 17 T.C.
647 (1951).
170 Rogers, Stifel Stifles Kieckhefer, 7 TAX L. REV. 500 (1952); Diamond, Tops
and Dolls - or Gifts to Minors, 30 TAXES 987 (1952).

NOTES
property is transferred to the child by way of a guardian who is uncontrolled by the donor, most courts would see fit to distinguish the
broad language of the Fondern and Disston cases and avoid the discrimination toward minor's gifts which denial of an exclusion would
embody. It should be clear that under the present state of the law, in
order to secure the benefit of an annual exclusion, a rather narrow line
must be walked in the case of minor children as donees. All writers
agree17 ' that it would be most improvident to distort a scheme of distribution to obtain this end under the present state of the law.
Provisions making it mandatory upon the trustee to pay over the
accrued income will normally make an annual exclusion available to the
extent of the value of the income paid out. As indicated previously, there
is some doubt where the income to be paid over exceeds the needs or
possible uses of the minor. What has been said with respect to outright
gifts beyond this extent seems equally applicable in the case of trusts.
In two District Court cases, Strekalowsky v. Delaney,172 and Cannon
v. Robertson,'73 however, an annual exclusion was sustained without any
reference to the actual needs of the beneficiaries. To the extent that the
Stifel case requires some showing of the probability that the contingency
set up for payment will occur, these cases are inconsistent.
The demands of the Stifel case, it seems, clearly prejudice dispositions
to minors with respect to the annual exclusion. If it is desired to make a
disposition of property to take advantage of the exclusion, and to use a
trust arrangement, not only must a right of termination be given, but it
must be given to someone who may effectively exercise it on behalf of the
child. Further, Stifel suggests that the third party be free of the influence of the family in exercising his power. And finally, Stifel, Fondern
and Disston leave considerable doubt as to whether even this will succeed except to the extent that a probability of an occasion arising for the
exercise of this power can be shown.
There is in existence a suggested form for a very convenient
and in74
expensive "baby trust" currently used to assume this risk.'
Ralph G. Schulz
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This form is set forth in SuRREY

171

AN

WARUN,

CASES AND

MATERIALS

ON

G= TAXATION 493 (1952). It is discussed in Rogers, Some
PracticalConsiderationsin Gifts to Minors, 20 FORD.L. REV.233, 253 (1951); Note,
53 COL. L. REv. 530, 538 (1953).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND

